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Jan Prochazka was a leading dissident during the totalitarian Commu-
nist regime in Czechoslovakia. He liked to meet and talk with another
dissident friend. The police secretly recorded their conversations. One day,
amazingly, the police began broadcasting the tapes on the radio. It was a
move to discredit Prochazka. According to the great Czech writer, Milan
Kundera, the tactic nearly succeeded. People were shocked because "in
private a person says all sorts of things, uses coarse language, acts silly, tells
dirty jokes ... floats heretical ideas he'd never admit in public and so
forth."' But gradually, people realized
[t]hat the real scandal was not Prochazka's daring talk but the rape
of his life; they realized, as if by electric shock, that private and
public are two essentially different worlds and that respect for that
difference is the indispensable condition, the sine qua non, for a
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man to live free; that the curtain separating these two worlds is not
to be tampered with, and that curtain-rippers are criminals.
2
In time, Kundera managed to leave Czechoslovakia for France. There
Kundera saw a magazine cover of Jacques Brel, the singer, hiding his face
from photographers who had ambushed him in front of a hospital where he
was being treated for advanced cancer. 3 "And suddenly," Kundera wrote, "I
felt I was encountering the very same evil that had made me flee my country;
broadcasting Prochazka's conversations and photographing a dying singer
seemed to me to belong to the same world."4
The reason I have begun by describing these two experiences of Milan
Kundera's is that they provide the setting, and the insight he drew, for one of
the most compelling modern statements in support of privacy as a humane
value. Kundera said in 1985,
For me, indiscretion is a capital sin. Anyone who reveals someone
else's intimate life deserves to be whipped. We live in an age
when private life is being destroyed. The police destroy it in
Communist countries, journalists threaten it in democratic coun-
tries, and little by little the people themselves lose their taste for
private life and their sense of it. Life when one can't hide from the
eyes of others-that is hell. Those who have lived in totalitarian
countries know it, but that system only brings out, like a magnify-
ing glass, the tendencies of all modem society .... Without se-
crecy, nothing is possible-not love, not friendship.
Kundera saw journalists as the destroyers of privacy in democratic
countries, the equivalent of the secret police. And he has a point. He gave a
French example. Britain, home of the world's sleaziest tabloids, is even
worse. American supermarket tabloids are ruthless in their exposure of the
famous, and latterly their tittle-tattle has often been copied by mainstream
newspapers and broadcasters. But the most striking development of recent
years in America has been the use of the legal process to expose the inner
life of individuals. Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel who tried to
drive President Clinton from office, used his menacing power to obtain from
Monica Lewinsky's personal computer her unsent love letters and personal




5. A Talk With Milan Kundera, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1985 (Magazine), at 85.
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House of Representatives. He also included, despite her anguished plea,
computer messages from a friend of Ms. Lewinsky's in Japan telling about
conflict with her husband.
Ms. Lewinsky especially resented a Starr subpoena demanding that a
Washington bookstore produce a record of all the books she had bought
6
there. "I felt like I wasn't a citizen of this country any more," she said. But
Starr said courts had upheld a subpoena for records of books read by
Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, so they should do the same
for him. That a prosecutor would advance so absurd an analogy shows how
the interest of privacy has been devalued in the legal mind.
Jeffrey Rosen's recent book, The Unwanted Gaze,7 compellingly de-
scribes what Rosen subtitles the book, The Destruction of Privacy in
America. He cites the lawsuit by Paula Jones as an example of how sexual
harassment law has been perverted into a destroyer of privacy.8 By accusing
President Clinton of an offensive sexual advance years before, Jones was
able to compel him, and others, to describe their consensual, private sexual
activities in testimony that inevitably became public.9 Monica Lewinsky was
asked by Jones's lawyers to hand over her diaries, address books, letters,
notes and so on.' 0 Rosen asks, "[H]ow could the law permit such unreason-
able searches, in which the investigation of the offense seemed more
invasive than the offense itself?""
We have come a long way in this country, a prurient way, from the
modest indignity that helped to provoke Louis D. Brandeis' great defense of
privacy: the use of pictures of his law partner's wife, without her consent, in
newspapers. Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel D. Warren, invented a
legal theory for the protection of privacy in their 1890 article in the Harvard
Law Review, The Right to Privacy.'2 They used a phrase that rings for us
still, "the right to be let alone.,
1 3
Brandeis was a man of strong and lasting convictions. Thirty-eight
years later he used that phrase again, dissenting from the decision of a
majority of his Supreme Court colleagues that wiretapping was not a search
6. ANDREW MORTON, MONICA'S STORY 215 (1999).
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subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 14 He
wrote:
The makers of our Constitution... recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to
be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men.15
The wiretapping decision from which Brandeis dissented has been
overruled by the Supreme Court.16 Tapping of telephones by government
agents is now subject to the Fourth Amendment's bar on "unreasonable
searches," though that gives the government a good deal of room to define
what is reasonable. But otherwise, the interest of privacy has not fared well
in the United States. What Kundera described as the curtain between every
individual's public and private life is well and truly ripped.
The odd thing is that privacy has suffered despite the adoption of law
designed to protect it. For the Brandeis-Warren article has had more effect
on law, in all likelihood, than anything else ever written for a law review.
Legislatures and courts in most states have made invasion of privacy a tort,
just as Brandeis and Warren proposed. Treatises have identified four
varieties of the tort: 1) appropriation of a person's name or likeness, like
Mrs. Warren's; 2) invasion of one's personal space, as by a concealed
microphone in a medical rescue helicopter; 3) a depiction that puts a person
in a false light; and 4) disclosure of truthful but embarassing private facts
about a person.17
But despite all those legal trappings, those grounds for recovery of
damages, lawsuits for violation of the right to privacy have not often proved
fruitful. In significant cases, judges have found the interest in privacy
outweighed by other interests. One of the earliest of those cases, and to me
one of the most tormenting, is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,' 8 decided in
1940.
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
15. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
17. W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
18. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
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William James Sidis, born in 1898, was a boy genius. 19 His father,
Boris, a psychologist, set out almost from birth to develop the boy's
faculties. William was said to be reading The New York Times by the age
of 18 months.2" By the time he started school, he knew not only English but
22was studying Latin and French. Boris trained him relentlessly, issuing
bulletins on William's progress to the press.23
At the age of eleven, William entered Harvard, and The New York
Times described him as the "wonderfully successful result of a scientific
forcing experiment., 24 But, as anyone might have predicted, William did not
enjoy the life forced upon him. After college and incomplete attempts at
graduate school, he sought obscurity.5 Working variously as a clerk and a
translator, Sidis dropped out of the public eye until 1937, when The New
26Yorker published an article about him by Jared L. Manley. The headline
was "Where Are They Now?" Under that was the line "April Fool," a play
on the fact that Sidis was born on April 1.27 The article described him as
living a lonely life in "a hall bedroom in Boston's shabby south end." 28 It
spoke of his "curious... laugh," his collection of streetcar transfers and his
29interest in the lore of the Okamakamesset Indians. It was, as a judge said, a
It 30
"merciless" exposure of a man who desperately desired to be let alone.
Sidis sued under state law for violation of his right to privacy.31
Because he and the company that published The New Yorker were from
32different states, the case was brought in federal court. It was decided in
1940 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an
opinion by a particularly thoughtful judge, Charles Clark, a former dean of
the Yale Law School.33 Judge Clark expressed sympathy for the plaintiff.
34
19. Jared L. Manley, Where Are They Now, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 14, 1937, at 22,
as discussed in Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.





25. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 809.
26. Manley, supra note 19, at 22.
27. Sidis, 113 F.2d at 807.
28. Id.
29. Id.




34. Id. at 807, 809.
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Sidis claimed that The New Yorker article had held him up to "public scorn,
ridicule and contempt," causing him "grievous mental anguish [and]
humiliation. ' 5 There was no reason to doubt the truth of those assertions.36
But Judge Clark found for the defendants, the publishers. 37 He did not find
them protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, he did not mention the
First Amendment, for the Supreme Court had not yet brought libel and
privacy within its ambit. He simply balanced the interests-Sidis's in
privacy, the society's in freedom of comment-and said the court was not
disposed "to afford to all the intimate details of private life an absolute
immunity from the prying of the press. 38  Brandeis to the contrary
notwithstanding, Judge Clark said, he would allow "limited scrutiny of the
'private' life of any person who has achieved, or has had thrust upon him,
the questionable and indefinable status of a 'public figure."'
39
"Thrust upon him," that phrase of Judge Clark's, is what lost the case
for Sidis. To many it may seem unfair-it does to me-that Sidis was more
vulnerable to public mocking for the rest of his life because of the fame his
father forced upon him. But I suppose it would be strange, in a country as
devoted to freedom of expression as this one, to bar the press and the public
from taking a continuing interest in someone who had been a publicized boy
genius. More recent interpretation of the First Amendment has made that
side of the balance even weightier.
Whatever the legal balance should have been when Sidis sued, there are
questions of journalistic decision-making. Was the Jared Manley article
good journalism? Should The New Yorker have printed it? Was it ethical to
do so? When I teach the Sidis case, I ask my students what other works by
Jared Manley they have read. It is a trick question, because Manley did not
exist. The name was a pseudonym used by the real author of the Sidis
article, who was James Thurber. Another thing: Thurber evidently did not
meet Sidis. The article said a woman, unnamed, had "recently succeeded in
interviewing him.",40 Did she disclose her purpose? Or did she pose as a
new friend of the lonely man so that she was invited to visit his hall bedroom
and inspect his collection of streetcar transfers? There is a smell of tabloid
journalism here that one does not usually associate with The New Yorker.
Publishing a story that pries brutally into someone's private life may not give
35. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 251 (1984).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 811.
38. Id. at 809.
39. Id.
40. Manley, supra note 19.
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the victim a right to damages, but it may nonetheless violate the standards of
decent journalism. William James Sidis lived just four years after the
Second Circuit decision. Unemployed and destitute, he died of a cerebral
hemorrhage.4'
The interest of privacy was first authoritatively weighed against the
First Amendment's protection of freedom to publish in a Supreme Court
42
case called Time, Inc. v. Hill. James Hill, his wife, and five children lived
in a suburb of Philadelphia.43 In 1952, three escaped convicts took over their
home.44 The Hills were held hostage for nineteen hours, but were treated
respectfully by the convicts, who left and ten days later were caught.45 The
press covered the story intensely, to the distress of the family and especially
of Mrs. Hill, who was a very private person.46 To escape from the glare of
publicity, the Hills moved to Connecticut and sought obscurity.
Two years later a play called The Desperate Hours opened on
Broadway. It depicted a two-day reign of terror by escaped convicts who
held a family hostage: brutality, sexual threats, and general menace. The
play was set in Indianapolis. But Life magazine, doing a feature on the
opening, photograped the actors in the former home of the Hills near
Philadelphia and described the play, with all its terror, as a reenactment of7
what had happened to the Hills. The Life story was devastating to the Hill
family.48 Mrs. Hill suffered a psychiatric breakdown.49 Mr. Hill said he
could not understand how Life could publish such a story without at least
telephoning him to check the facts.50 "It was just like we didn't exist," he
said, "like we were dirt."'"
41. See generally Jim Morton, Peridromophilia Unbound: William James Sidis, at
http://members.aol.com/popvoid/sidis.htm; John H. Lienhard, Engines of Our Ingenuity No.
969: William James Sidis, at http://www.uh.edu/engines/ epi969.htm.
42. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).




47. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1967).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court 242, 249-50
(Oxford Univ. Press 1985). See also Leonard Garment, Annals of Law: The Hill Case, THE
NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 1989, at 90, 109.
51. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 249.
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Mr. Hill sued Time, Inc., the publishers of Life, for violation of the New
York privacy statute.52 By associating his family with horrors that it had not
in fact experienced, he said, the article put the family in a false light.53 In the
New York courts, he won damages of $30,000.54 But Time, Inc. took the
case on to the United States Supreme Court, where Mr. Hill was represented
by Richard M. Nixon.55 After hearing argument on April 27, 1966, the
56justices voted 6-3 to affirm the Hills' modest judgment.
The opinion was assigned to Justice Abe Fortas. 7 He began with a
stinging attack on Life's handling of the story. 58  "Needless, heedless,
wanton and deliberate injury of the sort inflicted by Life's picture story," he
wrote, "is not an essential instrument of responsible journalism. Magazine
writers and editors are not, by reason of their high office, relieved of the
common obligation to avoid inflicting wanton and unnecessary injury. The
prerogatives of the press--essential to our liberty-do not preclude
reasonable care and avoidance of casual infliction of injury .... They do
not confer a license for pointless assault."
59
Justice Fortas went on to speak, eloquently, of the meaning of privacy
and its place in a civilized society.
[I]t is of constitutional stature.... [I]t is not only the right to be
secure in one's person, house, papers and effects, except as permit-
ted by law; it embraces the right to be free from coercion, however
subtle, to incriminate onesself; it is different from, but akin to the
right to select and freely to practice one's religion and the right to
freedom of speech; it is more than the specific right to be secure
against the Peeping Tom or the intrusion of electronic espionage
devices and wiretapping. All of these are aspects of the right to
privacy; but the right of privacy reaches beyond any of its specif-
ics. It is, simply stated, the right to be let alone; to live one's life as
one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they
can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a
government of law.
60
52. Time, 385 U.S. at 374.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 379.
55. Id. at 375.
56. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50 at 242.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Powerful words, but you will not find them in the reports of Supreme Court
decisions. At the passionate urging of Justice Hugo L. Black, the Supreme
Court set the case down for reargument the following fall.6' And then, by a
62
vote of 5-4, it reversed the judgment for Mr. Hill. What had happened?
Justice Black was the most committed advocate of free expression on the
Supreme Court at that time, and very likely at any time in the Court's
history. Just before the Hill case was reargued, in October, he circulated
among his colleagues a biting memorandum on the case.63 "After mature
reflection," he wrote, "I am unable to recall any prior case in this Court that
offers a greater threat to freedom of speech and press than this one does."
64
His point was that the press, imperfect as it inevitably is, would be
devastated if it were subject to damages for non-defamatory mistakes.
Two members of the Court changed their votes, and in January 1967, a
655-4 majority set aside Mr. Hill's judgment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
66
wrote the opinion of the Court. He had written the landmark libel opinion
67three years earlier in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. That decision held
that, because "the central meaning of the First Amendment" was the right to
criticize government and its officials, someone who published such criticism
could not be made to pay damages for mistakes unless such mistakes were
knowing or reckless falsifications. 68 Now, Justice Brennan applied the same
formula to the Hill case.69 Life's falsifying of the Hill family's story had not
been proved to be knowing or reckless, so it was entitled to a new trial at
which that question could be decided by a jury. 7° "The guarantees for
speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment
upon public affairs,' Justice Brennan wrote, "essential as those are to
healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to
comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to
public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized commu-
61. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 301.
62. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397-401 (1966).
63. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 299.
64. Id. at 301.
65. Time, 385 U.S. at 397-401.
66. Id. at 376.
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Id. at 273.
69. See generally Time, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 388.
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nity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
,,72
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press.
Milan Kundera, with his powerful feelings about the need for privacy,
would surely shudder at Justice Brennan's statement that "[e]xposure of the
self to others ... is a concomitant of life in a civilized community., 73 The
Kundera and Brennan views define the ultimate issue on this subject, the
conflicting claims of privacy and free expression. Each effectively dismisses
the prime value of the other.
Justice Fortas, joined by two other members of the Court, dissented.74
His opinion lacked most of the bitter rhetoric that was in his earlier draft of a
majority opinion. But he did say that a state should have "the right to
provide a remedy for reckless falsity in writing and publishing an article
which irresponsibly and injuriously invades the privacy of a quiet family for
" • • •,,75
no purpose except dramatic interest and commercial appeal. Reading the
record differently from the majority, he said the jury had found Life
reckless.76
The fourth dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, took a position that
I find convincing. 77 Because this case did not involve an official or famous
person, he said, the "marketplace" of free speech in which contesting ideas
are supposed to wrestle in First Amendment theory would not work. Mr.
Hill could not command an audience to answer Life's distortions. So, there
was a danger, Justice Harlan said, of "unchallengeable untruth. 8 °
Accordingly, he would have required Mr. Hill to prove only that Life's
editors had been negligent in making their mistakes, rather than what is
harder to prove, that they were deliberate or reckless in their falsification. 8 1
One thing more must be said about the troubling case of Time, Inc.
When details of the shifting votes inside the Court were made public in
Bernard Schwartz's The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court,83 in
1986, former President Nixon, who had argued the case twice for Mr. Hill,
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 411 (Fortas, CI., & Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Time, 385 U.S. at 415 (Fortas, CI., & Clark, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Fortas, C.J., & Clark, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. Time, 385 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
82. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
83. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 50.
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asked his former counsel and law partner, Leo Garment, to look into it.84
Mr. Garment wrote an article for The New Yorker.85 He noted a statement by
Justice Harlan that publicity carried a "severe risk of irremediable
harm... [to] individuals involuntarily exposed to it and powerless to protect
themselves against it."'86 Mr. Garment said there had been testimony at the
trial that the Life article had caused "lasting emotional injury" to Mrs. Hill.
Then he wrote:
Two eminent psychiatrists had explained the causal dynamics of
the trauma inflicted on her. Both said she had come through the
original hostage incident well but had fallen apart when the Life ar-
ticle brought back her memories transformed into her worst night-
mares and presented them to the world as reality. Both said she
was and would for an indefinite time remain a psychological tin-
derbox. In August, 1971, Mrs. Hill took her life."
Justice Brennan was a great figure on the Supreme Court: Sullivan88 in
particular was a transforming victory for freedom of expression. But I think
the principle was pressed too far in Time, Inc. v. Hill.89 James Hill was not a
public person of the kind for whom the Sullivan 9° rule was imposed,
someone who should have stayed out of the kitchen if he could not stand the
heat. Nor was Mrs. Hill. I do not think the Hills of this world should have
to jump such high hurdles in order to make a modest legal point about their
privacy.
Then think of the Hill9' case in terms not of law, but of journalistic
ethics. Justice Fortas's original criticism of Life-"needless, heedless, wan-
ton" 92 -was hyperbolic. But did he not have a point in suggesting that
responsible journalists have a duty of reasonable care, especially toward
powerless private individuals like the Hill family? Neither William Sidis nor
James Hill had sought public position or prominence; fame was thrust upon
them. But what of those who put themselves in the public eye, the politicians
84. Garment, supra note 50, at 90.
85. Garment, supra note 50.
86. Id. at 109.
87. Id.
88. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
89. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
90. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
91. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
92. SCHWARTZ, supra note 50, at 251.
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and celebrities who dominate today's publications and broadcasts? Do they
have any right to privacy at all?
Press attitudes on that question have changed drastically. When
Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, reporters and photographers effectively
hid from the public the fact that he spent most of his time in a wheelchair.
93
When a photographer new to the White House took a picture of the president
in his wheelchair, colleagues removed the film from his camera. Judge
Charles Clark, in the opinion rejecting Sidis's lawsuit, said that he could
imagine situations in which "public characters," as he called them, could
protect their privacy by law. 94 "Revelations," he said, "may be so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency." 95
Nowadays it is hard to imagine any revelation so intimate that it would
offend the public's sense of decency, or that the press would consider too
invasive to publish. Anything that shows a politician in a bad light,
especially a president, is fair game. And, of course, sex is best of all. We
can date the end of press inhibitions to the moment a reporter asked Senator
Gary Hart at a press conference, "Senator, have you ever committed
adultery?,
96
We are obsessed with the sex lives of politicians. When editors are
criticized for focusing on that subject, they often justify their choice by
arguing that sexual behavior bears on a politician's fitness for office. Yet, I
have never seen any evidence that sexual purity assures wise leadership.
When a Linda Tripp comes along with her tales and her tapes, I think .a
mainstream newspaper editor or broadcaster should tell her to peddle them to
a supermarket tabloid. That is what a French editor would surely do, but the
French equivalent of a supermarket tabloid would not be interested either.
Sex? What else is new? Only in the United States and Britain does the press
go mad over straying politicians. Why? Is it something about the Anglo-
Saxons, as the French call us? Or, is it a result of increasing competition for
readers and viewers? If we do not publish it, that is, some bottom-dwelling
slug will put it on his website. So in this view the news business is
experiencing something like Gresham's law, with the vulgar and sleazy
tending to drive out serious news. After September 11, 2001, newspapers
and broadcasters did turn more serious. But after a time, analysts have
93. FDR and Polio-A 'Splendid Deception', at http://www.feri.org/archives/polio/
deception.cfm.
94. See generally Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
95. Id. at 809.
96. See N.Y. TIMES, May 7,1987, at A1.
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found, many reverted to a search for the tawdry. Celebrity gossip is the
staple of much of the magazine and tabloid newspaper world. The vicious
gossip-monger who was the fictional antihero of Sweet Smell of Success97 is
not fictional any longer. But you do not have to be a celebrity to be a victim
of today's intrusive journalism.
Ruth Shulman was driving on a California highway when her car was
hit by another and rolled down an embankment. She was gravely hurt,99
ending up as a paraplegic. A rescue helicopter came to the scene of the
accident and flew Ms. Shulman to a hospital.t°° What she did not know was
that the nurse in the helicopter had a wireless microphone, and someone else101
had a video camera, filming her in agony. It all became part of a program
that was really not news but a debased form of entertainment. °2 Ms.
Shulman sued for invasion of her privacy.10 3  The Supreme Court of
California ruled that she could have no legal objection to filming at the scene
of the accident, but she was entitled to an expectation of privacy in the
helicopter and could recover damages for the intrusion by the broadcast
company into that privacy. °4
Or, think about Charles and Geraldine Wilson of Rockville, Maryland.
Early one morning, while they were still in bed, their nine-year-old
granddaughter was up and waiting for a school bus. They heard her open the
door to someone.'10 Mr. Wilson, wearing only briefs, went out to see who it
was. 10 6 Three policemen with guns drawn ordered him to the floor.10 7 A
photographer who was also there took a picture of him with an officer's knee
on his back and a gun at his head. °8 The photographer worked for The
Washington Post, as did the reporter who was there with him.1°9 They were
on what is called a "ride-along," accompanying the police in "Operation
Gunsmoke," a search for wanted felons." ° The Wilsons' adult son was
97. Ernest Lehman & Clifford Odets, Sweet Smell of Success (1957 screenplay).
98. Shulman v. Group W. Prod., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 475 (Cal. 1998).
99. Id. at 476.
100. Id. at 475.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 476.
104. Id. at 477.
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wanted on charges of violating probation and was a target of Operation
Gunsmoke."' He was not there, and in due course the police left.' 12 The
Wilsons sued the officers for violation of their Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and the case went to the United
States Supreme Court."
13
Some leading press organizations, including The New York Times, filed
a brief defending such press ride-alongs as legitimate under the Fourth
Amendment. 14 "The news media afford the public," the brief said, "a
unique window through which to observe the conduct of those offi-
cials ... and the social conditions they confront."' 1 5 Does that persuade
you? Not me. I do not think we need to find out about social conditions by
having reporters and photographers burst into private homes with armed
policemen. And it did not persuade the Supreme Court. It held that bringing
116
the press into the Wilsons' home violated the Fourth Amendment.
I spent fifty years as a newspaper reporter and columnist, and I believe
with all my heart in the First Amendment. If the press is to do its job, it must
look into some closed areas of government and society. It could hardly be
effective in holding power accountable if it had to ask the permission of
those who have power before looking into their activities. But, it is not
inconsistent with the great function of the press in keeping power account-
able to have some concern for the feelings of those who have not sought
power, for William Sidis or Ruth Shulman, for example. Or, for Oliver W.
Sipple, who had fame thrust upon him in an extraordinary way. On
September 22, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford was visiting San Francisco." 7
As he walked out of the St. Francis Hotel, a woman in the crowd, Sara Jane
Moore, raised a gun and aimed it at the President. 18 As she fired, Oliver
Sipple, a former Marine, struck her arm." 9 The shot missed Ford; Sipple
may have saved his life.
120
Two days later Herb Caen, a columnist in The San Francisco
Chronicle, carried an item suggesting that Sipple was gay and was a hero
111. Id. at 606.
112. Id. at 607.
113. Id.at608.
114. Brief of Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al. at *1, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999) (Nos. 97-1927, 98-83).
115. Brief of Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al. at *2, Wilson (Nos. 97-1927, 98-83).
116. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614.
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especially in the gay community of San Francisco. 121 Other newspapers
copied the story, and across the country Sipple was identified as gay. He
sued for invasion of privacy, arguing that he was indeed homosexual but that
he was entitled to damages for publication of private facts that would
embarrass him. 123 The California courts ruled against him, finding that his
sexual orientation was known to many before the Caen column so it was not
legally "private." 1
24
Decades ago the California courts held that publication of embarrassing
facts that had been known to the public years before could be penalized by
damages.125 The case involved a former prostitute who had been accused of
126murder but acquitted. In the following years, she had reformed, married
and become a respected member of the town where she lived. 127 Then a
movie was made about her life, The Red Kimono. 12 This had an adverse
effect on her social position, and she sued for violation of her privacy. An
appellate court said she was entitled to sue, but recent privacy decisions by
the Supreme Court of California indicated that that precedent might no
longer be followed. 129 Thus, the outcome of Oliver Sipple's lawsuit seemed
inevitable. The American legal culture, as it is today, would not accept a
prohibition on publication of facts already widely known.
Other societies take a different view. Britain, which has never had a
privacy tort, is developing one now after incorporation into domestic law of
the European Covenant on Human Rights, which protects the right to respect
for private and family life. 13  Early cases suggest that British courts may
embrace the French concept of the "right to rehabilitation"-the right for
past sins to be forgotten and an acknowledgment that information may be
legally "private" even though it is known to friends of the offended
plaintiff.' 1
The first important British decision expounding what we would call the
law of privacy was handed down in March 2002 by the Court of Appeal.
121. Id.
122. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
123. Id. at 667.
124. Id. at 668.
125. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See e.g., Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
130. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Part III, Art.
17, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
131. See A v. B Plc, 2 All E.R. 545 (C.A. 2002) available at 2002 WL 230787.
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The case was A v. B Plc.'32  Lord Chief Justice Woolf delivered the
judgment for a three-judge panel. 33 "A" was a leading British foot-
ball/soccer player who had had extramarital sexual relations with two
women, "C" and "D."' 3 "C" told her story to a tabloid Sunday newspaper,
"B."' 135 "A" obtained an injunction from a high court judge forbidding the
newspaper and the women to publish his, or anyone's, name. 136 Lord Woolf
set aside that restraint, giving what was an extraordinary victory to the
interest of freedom of expression-extraordinary because British judges in
the past have issued injunctions freely in disregard of that interest. 37 Judge
Woolf wrote:
Even trivial facts relating to a public figure can be of great interest
to readers .... Conduct which in the case of a private individual
would not be the appropriate subject of comment can be the proper
subject of comment in the case of a public figure .... The public
have an understandable and so a legitimate interest in being told
the information .... The courts must not ignore the fact that if
newspapers do not publish information which the public are inter-
ested in, there will be fewer newspapers published, which will not
be in the public interest.'
38
Lord Woolf made two other points that advanced the interest of free
expression in privacy matters. First, he said, "[r]elationships of the sort
which A had with C and D are not the categories of relationships which the
court should be astute to protect when other parties to the relationships do
not want them to remain confidential."'' 39 In other words, a public figure-
even one as fleeting as a football player-must bear the risk that the other
party to a sexual relationship may kiss and tell.14  Second, Woolf said that
courts "should not act as censors or arbiters of taste."' 4' It must leave that to
the ethics of journalism, policed in Britain to a certain extent by a body
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approach will be adopted by the publication than the court would regard as
acceptable is not relevant."
143
British tabloids are notoriously tasteless. But judges must not be
swayed by that, Lord Woolf was saying.' 44 Unless a judge weighing the
interest in privacy finds it distinctly more compelling than that of publica-
tion, the nature of the publication does not matter. With that, the British
press took a significant step toward the freedom its American colleagues
have enjoyed.
The American press has largely been triumphant in its resistance to the
law of privacy. It challenges the very constitutional premise of the true
Brandeisian legal action for deprivation of privacy: the idea that publication
of private facts, however embarrassing or even antisocial the publication
may be, can be penalized. The press argues that, under the First Amend-
ment, truth can never be penalized. The United States Supreme Court has
carefully avoided deciding that question, avoiding it, for example, when a
television station used the name of a victim of rape and murder when a state
law prohibited disclosure. 145 The Court held that the station could not be
penalized because a court official had inadvertently given it the victim's
146
name.
But the press should not be too comfortable-too arrogant, I might
better say-in its court victories against privacy claims. The public, coarse
as its tastes have become, may react against disclosure for disclosure's sake
if pressed too far against the powerless. There may still be, that is, what
Judge Clark in the Sidis case called "the community's notions of de-
cency."' 147 And, too, the public may react against developments in techno-
logy that strip us, unaware, of privacy, like a Microsoft Media Player that
keeps a log stored on the user's own computer of all the movies he plays.
Government in this country has accumulated powers more intrusive
than Justice Brandeis could have imagined. We need a press to watch it:
"[a] cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press," as Judge
Murray Gurfein put it in the Pentagon Papers case. But "the right to
know," that phrase chanted by some editors as if it were a magic incantation,
is not the only value in a democratic society, not even one as committed to
the freedom of expression as ours. Privacy is also a crucial value, for
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
146. Id. at 496-97.
147. Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
148. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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reasons powerfully expressed a few years ago by Professor Thomas Nagel of
New York University:
The distinction between what an individual exposes to public'view
and what he conceals or exposes only to intimates is essential to
permit creatures as complex as ourselves to interact without con-
stant social breakdown. Each of our inner lives is such a jungle of
thoughts, feelings, fantasies and impulses that civilization would be
impossible if we expressed them all .... Sex is an important part
of what must be managed in this way, if a civilized human being is
to be constructed on the ever-present animal foundation, but ag-
gression, fear, envy, self-absorption and vanity all form part of the
task.... Just as social life would be impossible if we expressed
all our lustful, aggressive, greedy, anxious or self-obsessed feelings
in ordinary public encounters, so would inner life be impossible if
we tried to become wholly persons whose thoughts, feelings, and
private behavior could be safely exposed to public view.1
49
We are in the age of exposure now-self-exposure on Oprah Winfrey and
the like, exposure of others by the press. Secrecy is a red flag to journalists,
rightly so. Governments use it to hide corruption and incompetence, and to
increase their unaccountable power. But in another sense-the sense
articulated by Thomas Nagel and Milan Kundera-secrecy is an essential
component of a civilized life.
149. Thomas Nagel, The Shredding of Public Privacy: Reflections on Recents Events
in Washington, Times Literary Supp., Aug. 14, 1998, available at
http://www.geocities.com/Capitol Hill/Senate/9634/tlsnagel.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
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